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Abstract
Objective To quantify randomness and cost when choosing health and
medical research projects for funding.
Design Retrospective analysis.
Setting Grant review panels of the National Health and Medical Research
Council of Australia.
Participants Panel members’ scores for grant proposals submitted in
2009.
Main outcome measures The proportion of grant proposals that were
always, sometimes, and never funded after accounting for random
variability arising from differences in panel members’ scores, and the
cost effectiveness of different size assessment panels.
Results 59% of 620 funded grants were sometimes not funded when
random variability was taken into account. Only 9% (n=255) of grant
proposals were always funded, 61% (n=1662) never funded, and 29%
(n=788) sometimes funded. The extra cost per grant effectively funded
from the most effective system was $A18 541 (£11 848; €13 482; $19
343).
Conclusions Allocating funding for scientific research in health and
medicine is costly and somewhat random. There are many useful
research questions to be addressed that could improve current
processes.
Introduction
Grant funding agencies strive to support the best scientific
research. Peer review is used to decide who gets funded by
includingtheopinionsofexperts,butproblemswithpeerreview
mean decisions might not be reliable.
Considerable research shows poor quality in peer review for
scientific journals. The authors of a Cochrane review found
little empirical evidence to support the use of editorial peer
reviewasamechanismtoensurequalityofbiomedicalresearch.
1
ReviewersattheAnnalsofInternalMedicinefailedtopicktwo
thirds of deliberate errors.
2 Blinding reviewers to the authors
and the origin of the manuscript or requiring them to sign the
peerreviewreporthadnoeffectonthedetectionrateforerrors.
3
Using reviewers suggested by authors over those selected by
editors failed to improved the quality of peer review for
journals.
4 A short training programme to improve peer review
had a slight effect, which disappeared after six months.
5 A
randomisedtrialshowedthattheperformanceofreviewerswas
improved only slightly with different types of training
intervention.
6
Surprisingly,giventheimpactthatdecisionsonresearchfunding
have on academic careers, relatively little research has been
done into the peer review of grant applications.
7 Thirty two
proposalsforfundingfromtheMcGillUniversityHealthCenter
Research Institute were assessed by two competing processes:
a traditional review committee of 11 members and independent
reviews from a committee member and content expert.
8
Agreement was poor and chance associated with funding
decisions was considerable. The authors of a study of 248 grant
proposals compared two similar peer review processes for
ranking proposals.
9 They found that agreement beyond chance
was only fair (Cohen’s κ=0.29) and that when proposals were
organised into one of two categories, clearly fundable and not
clearly fundable, agreement improved (Cohen’s κ=0.44). One
study
10 estimated that 38 416 reviews per grant would be
requiredtogetahighprecisionforthepeerreviewandselection
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RESEARCHof grants from the National Institutes of Health. Without high
precision some proposals will inevitably be incorrectly ranked
and may undeservedly miss out on funding. An analysis of
reviewers’ scores for grant proposals to the National Institutes
of Health showed that adjusting for uncertainties and biases
among reviewers would lead to a 25% change in the pool of
funded proposals.
11 Similarly, a study of proposals submitted
to the National Science Foundation re-reviewed 75 funded and
75 not funded grant proposals, and for 25% of proposals the
funding decision changed.
12
Lack of reliability in funding decisions might arise from
variationinpeerreviewamongexternalassessorsandmembers
of grant review panels. A journalist observed a grant review
panel for the American Cancer Society and suggested that
decisions were strongly influenced by individual preference
about whether the research was important; the pressure to find
tiny flaws in a grant proposal, so that it might be excluded; and
the ability of one or two reviewers to change the preferences of
others, a “cheerleader” effect.
13 One researcher suggested that
using review panels for grants was unreliable.
14 He proposed
thatpanelmembersfocusedonreasonstorejectproposals,some
competed with each other to show their intellectual prowess,
andsomehadlimitedknowledgeabouttheproposals’methods.
The membership of a grant review panel is somewhat random
and depends on who is invited and is available. This will affect
funding decisions because the preferences, personalities, and
knowledge of members will vary. Regardless of the panel’s
membership, strong and weak grant proposals should be
identified consistently, but most proposals are likely to occupy
a tightly packed middle ground. These proposals are the most
difficult to separate and a slight change in score can push a
proposal below or above a funding line.
Although previous studies have established that the assessment
of grantsisoften subject torelativelylowinter-rateragreement,
the impact this variability has on actual decisions about grant
funding has received less attention. Our focus is on the
variability in decisions and not on their validity. We addressed
this by using scores of grant panel members from de-identified
data supplied by the National Health and Medical Research
Council of Australia. We also estimated the cost effectiveness
of changing the size of the grant review panel. The impetus for
thisresearchwasthatsuccessratesforgrantproposalsarefalling
worldwide.
15SuccessratesfortheUKEngineeringandPhysical
Sciences Research Council fell from 43% in 2000 to 26% in
2008.
15 In Australia success rates for the National Health and
Medical Research Council dropped from 30% in 2000 to 23%
in 2010.
16 Unsuccessful applicants experience the double
jeopardy of a blow to their career and the cost of participating
in a lengthy application process. Our findings should be useful
for researchers considering whether to apply for a grant and
funding agencies looking to improve their review processes.
This research is timely, as funding agencies are expecting 5-10
years of flat or contracting research budgets as large national
debts are reduced by spending cuts.
17
Methods
TheNationalHealthandMedicalResearchCouncilofAustralia
committed 50.3% of its annual $A714m (£452m; €514m;
$745m) budget to the project grants scheme in 2009. Proposals
are unsolicited and cover most health and medical issues.
Applications are between 70 and 120 pages, including a nine
page research plan. The web extra shows the process.
Reliability in funding
We obtained the category and summary scores for all project
grants considered in the 2009 funding round. Proposals had
been assessed by one of 45 discipline specific review panels of
between seven and 13 members. Each panel scored between 42
and 92 proposals. The average score across all panel members
iscalculatedandapplicantsaresuccessfuliftheirscoreisabove
a funding line (see web extra).
We estimated the variability in panel members’ scores and
examined how this variability translated into the variability in
ranks, and hence variability in decisions on funding. For each
grantweestimatedthe90%confidenceintervalfortherankand
its minimum and maximum rank. We did this using a
non-parametric bootstrap procedure because we could not
assume that the panel scores followed a normal distribution.
Thevariabilityinaproposal’sscoreisestimatedbyre-sampling
original scores from panel members with replacement to
generate a slightly different panel (see web extra). After
estimating the range in ranks we grouped the proposals into
threecategories:neverfunded,ifthemaximumrankwasbelow
the funding line; always funded, if the minimum rank was on
or above the funding line; and sometimes funded, if the range
in ranks straddled the funding line. We used each proposal’s
90%confidenceintervaltodeterminewhetheritwaseffectively
funded. If the lower limit of the 90% confidence interval was
above the funding line then the proposal was correctly funded
(effectively funded). If the upper limit of the 90% confidence
intervalwasbelowthefundinglinethenaproposalwascorrectly
rejected (also effectively funded); the 90% value is arbitrary.
Wealsoassessedtheeffectofchangingthesizeofreviewpanels
by re-sampling different numbers of scores to represent panels
of seven, nine, and 11 members.
Cost and effectiveness
The costs of the grant allocation processes are shared by
researchers who prepare proposals, peer reviewers who are
either external reviewers or members of grant review panels,
and the National Health and Medical Research Council which
administers the scheme. To understand preparation costs, one
week after the 2009 closing date we surveyed 42 chief
investigators from two medical research institutes in Brisbane,
Australia who led 54 grant proposals. They were asked to
estimate how many working days they spent preparing their
grant proposal. Their salary grade and the full costs of
employment were available from the institutions’ websites. To
estimate peer review costs we assumed average reading times
per grant proposal of four hours for external peer reviewers and
primary spokespeople and two hours for secondary
spokespeople. We assumed that review panel members spent
20 minutes reading each of the other grant proposals and 46
hours working during the week the review panel met. These
estimates are based on our experiences as grant review panel
members and external reviewers and the opinions of our
colleagues.TheNationalHealthandMedicalResearchCouncil
of Australia provided the information on the cost of
administeringthescheme.Itreportedthecostsofextrastaffing,
bookingthehotelandconferencefacilitiesforthereviewpanel,
travel, and sitting fees.
CostswereexpressedinAustraliandollarsandtheeffectiveness
outcome by the proportion of grants effectively funded. We
estimated both for a panel of seven, nine, and 11 members, and
we calculated the incremental cost per extra grant effectively
funded.
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Observed scores and range in ranks
Overall,2983grantproposalsweresubmittedin2009.Ofthese,
278 were under a special initiative and were excluded from
analysis because they were assessed using different criteria. Of
the 2705 that remained, 620 (23%) were funded, ranging from
9% to 38% across the 45 panels. Table 1⇓ shows the impact of
the variability in panel members’ scores on funding decisions.
Overall, 59% of the 620 originally funded proposals were
sometimes not funded when the effect of random variability
was included. Eighty per cent (n=1662) of the 2085 grant
proposals not originally awarded were never funded. In total
only 9% (n=255) of grants were always funded, 61% (n=1662)
were never funded, and 29% (n=788) were sometimes funded.
Figure 1⇓ shows how these proportions changed with different
panel sizes. Adding panel members increased reliability, as
shownbytheshrinkingpercentageofproposalsinthesometimes
funded category.
The range in ranks was plotted for the panel with the largest
proportion of proposals that were sometimes funded (fig 2⇓)
and the panel with the smallest proportion of proposals that
were sometimes funded (fig 3⇓). Figure 2 shows a wide
variability in ranks, and only one proposal was always funded.
The rank for the proposal marked with an asterisk ranged from
the fifth best to the worst. In contrast the ranges in ranks for
figure 3 are much tighter, meaning that the reliability in
decisions in the panel was greater and hence the proportion of
alwaysfundedandneverfundedproposalswashigher.Acluster
of six grants was scored the same by every panel member and
were all always funded.
Costs and effectiveness
Most researchers spent between 20 and 30 days preparing their
grant proposal, with a median 22 (interquartile range 20–32)
days per grant proposal. On two of 54 occasions the lead
investigator spent more than 65 days preparing the application
andonfiveof54occasionsthechiefinvestigatorspentlessthan
15 days (although these researchers indicated that they had
shifted preparation costs on to junior researchers). The total
costs of the funding exercise were $A47.87m with 85%
($A40.85m) incurred by applicants, 9% ($A4.44m) for peer
review by external assessors and review panel members, and
5% ($A2.59m) to administer the scheme. Both effectiveness
and costs increased with larger panels (table 2⇓).
Discussion
Theassessmentofgrantproposalsiscostlyandsubjecttoahigh
degree of randomness owing to variation in panel members’
assessments.Therelativelypoorreliabilityinscoringbypanels
might be expected given the complexity of the task and the
subjective nature of the assessment process. The degree of
reliability varied greatly between panels (figs 2 and 3)
suggesting that in some disciplines review panels find it more
difficult than in others to agree on a proposal’s quality. The
totalcostperproposalwas$A17744,witharound85%incurred
byapplicants.Themedianestimateof22dayspreparingagrant
multiplied by the 2983 grant proposals submitted shows that in
2009 180 years of researcher time was used up. The costs per
grant proposal were similar in the United Kingdom, at £196m
a year, or £9797 ($A15 676) per proposal.
18
The benefits of participating vary for the applicants: those who
score in the top 9% are always funded (table 1), the next 29%
face uncertainty and may or may not be rewarded for their
efforts, and the remaining 61% face certain outcomes of zero
as the variation among assessors was insufficient for them to
ever score above the funding line. For this last group the time
invested in the process is likely to be a deadweight loss other
than some process utility from writing the grant and from
participating in peer review. Applicants in this group might
havebenefitedmorefromdoingsomethingelsewiththeirtime.
Reliability can be increased by using the most effective system
of 11 panel members. This is probably worth while as the extra
cost per extra grant effectively funded is $A18 541, only 3% of
the average grant value awarded in 2009.
Limitations of the study
The scores of panel members are unlikely to be independent.
Each grant is assigned a primary and secondary spokesperson
who would tend to lead the panel discussion (see web extra). It
would be unusual if every panel member reviewed every grant
in detail, and we think most panel members are grateful for the
opportunity to listen to the views of the assigned spokesperson.
Thisdoesnotmeanthatpanelmemberswillnothijackorrescue
a grant they believe is being inappropriately judged. The
direction and magnitude of any dependence, however, could
not be tested from the available data. Importantly, this study
has only considered one aspect of variation: variation owing to
panel members’ scores in relation to the funding line. Also, the
costs of preparing grants were elicited from a small sample of
researchers based at two institutions, and a nationally
representative sample would more accurately reflect costs.
Supply and demand side regulation
Given the high costs associated with research funding schemes
itisworthconsideringotherapproachesbyimplementingsupply
and demand side regulations to change the rules of funding. A
supply side measure is to impose a production quota. Each
applicant might be limited to one grant proposal per round; at
present applicants are limited to holding a maximum of six
project grants. A concern from using a quota system is that
creativity is stifled and only safe proposals are submitted.
18
However, the high level of competition for funding and the
tendency for review panels to be risk averse compared with
individuals suggests pioneering and so potentially risky
proposals are unlikely to be funded anyway.
19 This type of
production quota is likely to thwart researchers who are
particularlyskilledatwinninggrants.Analternativeisatargeted
production quota that excludes unsuccessful applicants for a
cooling off period as implemented by the UK Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council. Disgruntled applicants
complainedofunfairnessandofbeingsingledout.
15Thissystem
would reduce total proposals but not shut out the researchers
skilled at winning grants. Support for this approach came from
an editorial in Nature titled “Tough Love” whose author
recognised that falling rates of success mean some researchers
will incur large deadweight costs from which they might be
protected.
20 A demand side intervention is to inform applicants
about the probability their grant was funded using the results
generated by the bootstrap procedure, described in this paper
and the web extra. If failed applicants are shown they always
ranked below the funding line then they might decide it is not
worth putting any more time into re-submitting the proposal.
The application procedure could also be simplified. Currently,
proposals are between 70 and 120 pages long, with only nine
used for the research plan. A reduction in paperwork will save
the costs of preparation and peer review and should make it
easier to recruit assessors.
21 A limit may, however, apply to
whichthereisscopeforchangingapplicationprocessesasmuch
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meaning the National Health and Medical Research Council of
Australia would have to negotiate for its removal.
Further research
Further research might examine other sources of variation. An
interesting experiment would be to give the same set of grants
totwoindependentreviewpanelswhosemembersdidnotknow
whethertheirscoresweregoingtobeusedtoinformthefunding
decision. Our hypothesis is that the variability in funding
decisions between these two panels would be greater than we
foundfromouranalysis.Thisexperimentmightberepeatedfor
differentdisciplines,suchascellbiologyorpublichealth,given
the large differences between panels we observed. The same
designcouldbeusedtoassessashortenedapplicationandpanel
process to see whether similar levels of reliability could be
achieved at lower cost. A short application process would be
easier to apply for and easier to review and may take less
administration time. Reliability may even increase as external
reviewers and panel members have less information to
synthesise.Othersystemscouldbetestedforreliabilityandcost
such as a journal style approach where grant proposals are
submitted to a subeditor who makes an initial cull. Survivors
arereviewedexternallyandarethenconsideredbyexperteditors
and a recommendation made to fund or not. An initial cull is
alreadyusedbysomegrantagencies,byonlyaskingfordetailed
proposals from those proposals that make it through the first
round. Although these experiments will take time and effort,
thecostsofaresearchprogrammetolookatwaysofimproving
the funding process is likely to represent only a small fraction
of the total research money allocated each year through
competitive funding mechanisms.
Another avenue for investigation would be to assess the formal
inclusionofrandomness.Theremaybemeritinallowingpanels
to classify grants into three categories: certain funding, certain
rejection,orfundingbasedonarandomdrawforproposalsthat
are difficult to discriminate. Random allocation has been used
in the assignment of medical places in the Netherlands to
increasediversityinstudentbackgrounds,
22butwearenotaware
of it ever being used in research funding. It may save costs too
by reducing the duration of panels’ discussion. In 1998
Greenberg
23 called for 15-20% of funding by the National
Institutes of Health to be allocated by lottery saying “instead of
dodgingthefactthatchanceplaysabigpartinawardingmoney,
the system will sanctify chance as the determining factor.”
Conclusions
Prospectively funding individuals for their research is fraught
with problems that can be reduced but not eliminated.
Retrospectiveassessmentofactualperformancemaybeabetter
system.
24Itcouldbebasedonresearchproductivityandbroader
health impacts. Funding could be allocated using quantifiable
evidenceratherthanpromises,includingpublishedpapers,new
policies, or observable improvements in health. Anecdotal
evidencesuggestsresearchersskilledatwinningfundingalready
use this approach by completing most of the research activity
before applying for funding. There would of course have to be
a reasonable programme of seed funding to get talented
researchers started.
Given the impact research funding decisions can have on
academic careers,
25 it is surprising that relatively little research
has been carried out into its processes.
7 This study tackled the
degree of random variation due to differences in the ratings of
grant review panel members, and the costs of the process. We
found that random variation affected many proposals that were
assessed by an Australian medical research council in a single
fundingyear.Thisinformationisusefulandrepresentsastarting
point for additional research to understand the degree of
variability in funding decisions, its causes and consequences,
and how funding processes might be improved.
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RESEARCHWhat is already known on this topic
Health and medical research aims to progress evidence based medicine, but decisions about which proposals to fund
are not grounded in evidence
There is a shortage of research in this area
The best research proposals should be chosen for funding
What this study adds
Decisions about funding health and medical research are somewhat random
Applicants bear the most costs because of the length of time needed to prepare a proposal
Larger panels are better than smaller ones
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Table 1| Impact of variability in review panel members’ scores on funding decisions
Total No (%) No (%) originally awarded No (%) not originally awarded Alternatively awarded
1662 (61) 0 1662 (80) Never
788 (29) 365 (59) 423 (20) Sometimes
255 (9) 255 (41) 0 Always
2705 620 2085 Total
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Incremental cost effectiveness
ratio* ($A) Extra grants effectively funded Increase in cost ($A) Grants effectively funded Total costs ($A) Funding process
2200 46 276 513 7 panel member
15 043 53 797 258
2253 47 073 771 9 panel members
18 541 43 797 258
2296 47 871 029 11 panel members
$A1.00 (£0.66; €0.75; $1.10).
*Extra cost per grant effectively funded from choosing next most effective funding process.
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Fig 1 Proportion of grants that were never funded, sometimes funded, and always funded if review panels had seven, nine,
or 11 members
Fig 2 Range in ranks for grants assessed by review panel with largest proportion of sometimes funded proposals
Fig 3 Range in ranks for grants assessed by review panel with smallest proportion of sometimes funded proposals
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